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and disinformation as a new source of insecurity on a global scale. How can 
we make sense – analytically and politically – of this newly politicized nexus 
of public health, information management, and global security? This article 
proposes approaching the phenomenon of the infodemic as an intersecting 
securitization of information disorder and health governance. Specifically, it 
argues that there are two distinct frames of security mobilized in the context of 
infodemic governance: information as a disease and information as a weapon. Drawing 
on literatures on global health and the emerging research on disinformation, 
the paper situates the two framings of the infodemic in broader discourses 
on the medicalization of security, and securitization of information disorder, 
respectively. The article critically ref lects on each framing and offers some 
preliminary thoughts on how to approach the entanglements of health, security, 
and information disorder in contemporary global politics.
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Already at the very beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, on 15th February 
2020, the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus warned that “we’re not just fighting an ep-
idemic; we’re fighting an infodemic. Fake news spreads faster and more easily 
than this virus, and is just as dangerous” ( W H O 2020A ) . In a similar spirit, the US 
President Joe Biden asserted that misinformation about the pandemic and 
the COVID-19 vaccines is “killing people” ( B B C 2 02 1) . Albeit published in dif-
ferent contexts and at different stages of the pandemic, these statements 
share a common message: by denying the existence or seriousness of the 
virus, or promoting distrust in vaccines and other medical measures, mis-
leading information makes the outbreak of the pandemic worse. This phe-
nomenon has been described by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
as an infodemic, understood as an “overabundance of information – some ac-
curate and some not – that occurs during an epidemic. It can lead to confusion 
and ultimately mistrust in governments and public health response ” (WHO 
2020b). The WHO and other experts warn that the harmful impact of the 
infodemic is amplified by digital technologies and thus it poses a more se-
rious problem than similar phenomena in the past.
The discourse on the infodemic constructs the combination of the 
pandemic and disinformation as a new source of insecurity on a global 
scale. How can we make sense – politically and analytically – of this newly 
politicized nexus of public health, information management, and global 
security? In this article, I argue that the phenomenon of the infodemic can 
be understood as an intersecting securitization of health and informa-
tion disorder. I highlight some recent theoretical developments in global 
health, a field of International Relations studying the entanglements of 
global politics and public health, and outline how research on global health 
might approach the theme of disinformation. I draw on literature on global 
health security ( E L B E 2 010 ;  H A R M A N 2 012 ;  K I C K B U S C H 2 0 05 ;  M C I N N E S – L E E 2 012) and link 
it with the emerging research on political, social, and military dimensions 
of disinformation ( DA N I E L  – E B E R L E 2 018 ,  2 02 1 ;  F R I DM A N 2 018 ;  G A L E O T T I 2 019;  L A N O S Z K A 
2 016 ;  M ON S E E S 2 02 1) . Specifically, I use the concept of information disorder, as 
introduced by Wardle and Derakhshan ( 2 017) . The concept of information 
disorder goes beyond the notions of ‘fake news’ or disinformation, which 
have been appropriated by political elites around the world and which 
provide only a narrow perspective on an otherwise rather complex phe-
nomenon ( WA R D L E – D E R A K H S H A N 2 017:  5) . The concept of information disorder 
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highlights the roles of different actors involved in the production, circula-
tion, and consumption of messages and distinguishes several types of mes-
sages (mis-, dis-, and malinformation).1 As such, the term acknowledges the 
multiplicity of intentions, harm, and dynamics of information circulation.
This paper shows that the discourse on the infodemic mobilizes two 
distinct – yet not mutually exclusive – security narratives constructing 
the link between health and information disorder. In the first narrative, 
information is framed as a disease, and its governance is informed by the 
logic of medicalization of security. In the second narrative, information is 
framed as a weapon, used strategically in international politics as a part 
of (geo)political rivalry, and approached via the lenses of militarization. 
I briefly describe the key tenets of each framing of the information dis-
order and critically reflect on them. By doing so, the article seeks to pro-
vide some preliminary reflections on how to think about the intersecting 
securitization of health and information governance, and outline how to 
understand the increasing interconnectedness of health, disinformation, 
and global security through broader literatures.
POWER, KNOWLEDGE, AND THE VIRUS: 
TWO TALES OF (IN)SECURITY
As we have been reminded via numerous examples, from negotiating the 
regimes for covid-safe international travel ( E . G .  C R E S S W E L L 2 02 1 ;  S E Y F I   – H A L L  – 
S H A BA N I 2 02 0) to vaccine production and distribution ( DAV I E S – W E N H A M 2 02 0 ;  E . G . 
F I D L E R 2 02 0 ;  KO B I E R E C K A – KO B I E R E C K I 2 02 1) , the pandemic is a social phenomenon 
shaping and shaped by multiple political factors. The efforts to contain the 
virus have intersected with numerous global political and security issues, 
from the functioning of global health institutions to intellectual property 
rights, international mobility, border control, data protection, or human 
rights. However, the conceptual vocabulary for exploring the links between 
health, global security, and newly also disinformation is still rather limited.
The meaning-making of the COVID-19 pandemic is still an open-end-
ed process, but what resonates strongly in many discussions on the pan-
demic is the role of information governance as affecting the governance of 
the disease. To tackle the pandemic, individual citizens are asked to do their 
part of the job and follow specific hygiene and medical practices – wear 
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masks, socially distance, wash their hands, and get vaccinated. This ap-
proach, however, exposes some vulnerability of the liberal democratic poli-
tics: on the one hand, citizens are entitled to make informed choices about 
their health individually (such as whether to get vaccinated against covid), 
but on the other hand, to fully protect the population and stop the virus 
from further mutating, these rules and practices would ideally be followed 
by everyone. To persuade the citizens to follow these rules, their trust in 
the public authorities issuing these rules is needed (C F.  E . G .  H E L S I N G E N E T A L .  2020 ; 
S I E G R I S T E T A L .  2 02 1) . Instead of focusing on building trust, however, much of 
the public as well as expert debate about compliance and non-compliance 
with the individual measures is focused on the issue of news consumption 
and the “quality” of information about the pandemic that citizens receive.
When we look at the discourse on the infodemic, we can find two 
main framings of the health-information nexus, or the infodemic: on the 
one hand, information as a disease, and on the other hand, information as 
a weapon. While the first framing focuses on consequences of information 
disorder and how to deal with it, the second one highlights the role of agents 
(allegedly) creating and controlling the information disorder and links it 
with the struggle for power in the international arena. This section looks 
at these narratives to reflect on the logic and strategies that they promote.
INFORMATION AS A DISEASE
According to the WHO, “[a]n infodemic is too much information including 
false or misleading information in digital and physical environments during 
a disease outbreak. It causes confusion and risk-taking behaviours that can 
harm health. It also leads to mistrust in health authorities and undermines the 
public health response” ( W H O 2021) . In effect, an infodemic can prolong an out-
break. The WHO further points out that an infodemic is interconnected 
with the rise of social media and the internet. As a remedy, it promotes 
infodemic management based on “risk- and evidence-based analysis” and pro-
viding “credible health information, and building resilience to misinformation 
for people worldwide ” ( W H O 2 02 1) .
It is in this context that scientists reinvigorate the research of in-
fodemiology ( E . G .  C UA N - BA LTA Z A R E T A L .  2 02 0) , initially established to improve 
public health through measuring and tracking health information on the 
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internet and in the population ( E YS E N BAC H 20 09) , and seek to measure the im-
pact of misinformation on the dynamic of the pandemic, as exemplified, 
for instance, by the intent to get vaccinated ( L O O M BA E T A L .  2 02 1) . The WHO 
directly supports infodemiology, suggesting that it shall aim to “build and 
deliver sustainable tools that health authorities and communities can use to 
prevent and overcome the harmful impacts caused by infodemics” ( W H O 2 02 1) .
In its call for action to manage the infodemic, the WHO and many 
other experts call for “information hygiene” and seek to develop good prac-
tices for this type of personal behaviour: “Although infodemics are not a new 
phenomenon, the volume and rapid scale-up of facts, but also misinformation 
and disinformation, surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak are unprecedented. 
Owing to the opportunities and challenges brought by new technologies and so-
cial media platforms, the infodemic that accompanies the first pandemic of the 
digital age is more visible and challenging than ever before. Practicing informa-
tion hygiene, just as we are practicing hand and cough hygiene, is thus becoming 
vital to prevent the spread of the virus” ( W H O 2 02 0 C) .
The problem of the infodemic is constructed as a technologically 
mediated problem directly affecting health practices of people during 
a health emergency. Therefore, individual resilience against “bad news” is 
supported – typically via the promotion of good practices on information 
hygiene – and seen as a way to build societal resilience against disinfor-
mation and consequently also the pandemic. This logic is promoted, for 
instance, by the European Union External Action Service, which writes 
about building “immunity” to covid disinformation: “Just like vaccines can 
provide immunity to viruses, including COVID-19, we can build immunity to dis-
information. And we can do it ourselves. Hygiene, such as frequent hand-wash-
ing, helps to protect us from COVID-19. In the same manner, information hygiene 
can slow down the spread of harmful misleading information, especially on the 
social media” ( E E A S 2 02 1) .
Among the initiatives to counter covid misinformation was, for in-
stance, a global campaign launched by the UK Government in partnership 
with the WHO and the BBC called “Stop The Spread”, which aimed to raise 
the public’s awareness of covid misinformation and encouraged people to 
double-check the information that they hear – and intend to spread – about 
the pandemic from trusted sources. Similar initiatives typically focus on, 
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first, increasing trust in scientific evidence and sharing positive messages 
about vaccines, and, second, fact-checking and fighting myths about covid 
and vaccines. The latter becomes a particularly vibrant sphere with many 
actors getting involved in promoting good practices of information hy-
giene, media literacy, and fact-checking, including governments and state 
institutions (e.g. the “Stop The Spread” campaign, the online game called 
Go Viral!, which is supported by the UK government, the fact-checking 
website of the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, etc.), civil 
society (such as the News Literacy Project), as well as international orga-
nizations (e.g. the EU-funded project EUvsDisinfo).
The politicization of the infodemic can be seen as a recognition of 
how social and political factors play a role in governing health. Scholars 
of global health have already pointed out how global health governance 
gets increasingly securitized, as certain health issues are framed as se-
curity threats and approached via exceptional, or otherwise non-tradi-
tional policy means ( E L B E 2 0 06 ;  F I D L E R 2 0 03 ;  H OW E L L 2 014 ;  K E L L E 2 0 07;  M C I N N E S  – L E E 
2 012 ;  S J O S T E D T 2 0 0 8) . At the same time, they observe another development at 
the boundary of security and health politics: the use of medical language 
and practices to address security issues. This medicalization of insecurity, 
as Elbe shows ( E L B E 2 010,  2 012) , leads to more and more pressure to develop 
medical interventions at the level of the individual as well as the soci-
ety and ultimately contributes to reconceptualizing the logic of security 
( E L B E – VO E L K N E R 2 014:  78 –79) . As such, the medicalization of insecurity relates 
to a changing understanding of security and insecurity in world politics 
and changing views on who is entitled to practice security and through 
what instruments ( E L B E 2 012) .
The tale of information disorder as a disease is firmly based on the 
logic of medicalization of insecurity. By using medical metaphors to de-
scribe the nature of the problem and the solutions to it, it provides a seem-
ingly depoliticized view on the interconnectedness of health, technology, 
and social behaviour. However, this view overlooks actors as well as sys-
temic factors behind the production and circulation of conspiracy theo-
ries, misleading news, and mixed messages. Instead of searching for who 
is responsible for the information disorder, or focusing on the underlying 
social, political as well as technological conditions that make it possible 
and desirable, the tale of information as a disease focuses on prevention 
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and the cure. This framing of the infodemic provides a very narrow, tech-
no-individualistic narrative which puts emphasis on media literacy and 
effectively responsibilizes the individual for developing resilience amid 
the infodemic rather than looking for social conditions that enable the 
covid-related information disorder.
INFORMATION AS A WEAPON
Apart from the medical framing of the infodemic, which presents the rise 
of information disorder as yet another virus complicating the containment 
of the pandemic, we can find another framing of the health-information 
nexus – a security framing constructing the information disorder as a tool 
of (geo)political rivalry. This framing focuses on disinformation and foreign 
influence operations and presents the COVID-19 information disorder as 
a part of the struggle for power and authority in the international arena. 
The covid-related information disorder is then seen as a product of influ-
ence campaigns and “weaponized” information. Some experts even suggest 
understanding this nexus as a cyber-biowarfare and argue that: “…in light 
of the rise of state-sponsored online disinformation campaigns we are approach-
ing a fifth phase of biowarfare with a ‘cyber-bio’ framing. […] Biowarfare in the 
fifth era aims to undermine sociopolitical systems through social, political, and 
economic means by ‘weaponizing’ or ‘virtually escalating’ natural outbreaks, 
rather than directly inducing mortality and morbidity in populations through 
the deployment of harmful biological agents” ( B E R N A R D E T A L .  2 02 1:  3) .
Neither misinformation related to disease outbreaks nor informa-
tion campaigns about biological weapons are new. For instance, during 
the Cold War, the Soviet Union accused the United States of creating HIV/
AIDS (G R I M E S 2 017 ) , and similarly China and North Korea argue that the 
United States engaged in germ warfare during the war in Korea ( L E I T E N B E RG 
2 016) . What is new in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, is 
the popularity of these narratives and the fact that they have been openly 
shared by some political elites, experts, and mainstream media, and not 
only by fringe players of the information space.
Some of the narratives focus on accusing other states of mishan-
dling the pandemic; others go as far as to argue that COVID-19 is a man-
made biological weapon and the information disorder related to it is 
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a part of co-ordinated state-sponsored information campaigns, which 
are sometimes even referred to as a new type of biological war ( D F R L A B 2 02 1) . 
Interestingly, this framing can be found not only in policy circles whose 
communication is typically aimed at a domestic audience, but in certain 
versions also among academics and think-tank experts ( E . G .  B E R N A R D E T A L . 
2021;  N I E 2020) . The best-known example is the repeated labelling of COVID-19 
as the “Chinese virus” and the “Wuhan virus” by the US President Donald 
Trump ( L I N DA M A N  – V I A L A- G AU D E F ROY 2 02 0) , which put the blame for the pan-
demic on China and went against the guidelines of the WHO for naming 
of diseases ( W H O 2 015) . This further intensified when Trump pursued the 
lab leak theory, suggesting that SARS-CoV−2 was originally engineered 
as a bioweapon by researchers in the Wuhan laboratory (S I N G H E T A L .  2 02 0) .
Both the United States and the European Union further accused 
Russia of aggravating the pandemic situation in the West by spreading 
disinformation (G L E N Z A 2 02 0 ;  R A N K I N 2 02 0) . The Strategic Communications 
and Information Analysis Division (StratCom) of the European External 
Action Service has been particularly active in monitoring the information 
disorder and repeatedly warned against “pro-Kremlin” COVID-19 disin-
formation ( E E A S 2 02 1) . In a report on COVID-19 disinformation, it explains 
the relevance of these narratives: “In the EU and elsewhere, coordinated dis-
information messaging seeks to frame vulnerable minorities as the cause of the 
pandemic and to fuel distrust in the ability of democratic institutions to deliver 
effective responses. Some state and state-backed actors seek to exploit the public 
health crisis to advance geopolitical interests, often by directly challenging the 
credibility of the European Union and its partners” ( E E A S 2 02 0) .
What receives particular attention in this regard is theories that 
“deny the actual epidemiological complexities of the pandemic while offering 
simple geopolitical imaginations of sinister powers who conspire against the 
world’s population” (S T U R M E T A L .  2 02 1:  7) . These stories offer a simple explana-
tion of global affairs, assuming the existence of international power struc-
tures that initiate conspiracies of a global scale. Such narratives can be 
understood as constructing alternative geopolitical imaginaries, or fanta-
sies of geopolitics (C F.  L A K E TA 2019) , and thus offering alternative visions of the 
socio-political order – which is exactly what makes them seem threatening.
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This framing and this approach, however, are not new and need 
to be contextualized in the prior securitization of information disorder, 
which has been promoted by some actors for already a few years now as 
a part of the fight against “hybrid threats”. As argued elsewhere ( M ON S E E S 
2021;  RYC H N OVS K Á – KO H Ú T 2018), in an attempt to explain the polarization of soci-
ety and the rise of populism in Europe and the United States, information 
disorder has been securitized and framed in military terms, shifting the 
attention to state-sponsored propaganda and information operations and 
presenting them as a part of a new type of ‘hybrid warfare’ ( DA N I E L – E B E R L E 
2 02 1 ;  M Ä L K S O O 2 018) . StratCom is a typical example of a platform where the 
practices of fighting disinformation have been institutionalized for several 
years now as a part of the EU’s response to hybrid threats.
There are multiple security narratives framing COVID-19 as a weap-
on, ranging from pure conspiracy theories interpreting COVID-19 as an 
intentionally released bioweapon, to those that focus on countries that 
want to use the pandemic for their own gain and use misinformation for 
that purpose. What unites them is the focus on state actors as the exclu-
sive – or at least dominant – producers and disseminators of the COVID-19 
disinformation, and the interpretation of these narratives as a part of 
foreign influence operations. I propose to look at these narratives as mil-
itaristic, since they provide a state-centric perspective on the problem of 
the infodemic, and they explicitly or implicitly treat (dis)information as 
a weapon in the hands of states. I sought to show that this framing is not 
new but is embedded in the existing securitization of information disorder 
(most visible in the EU), which has shaped the discourse and practices on 
the covid-related infodemic.
GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AND INFORMATION DISORDER
This paper identified two frames of security present in the discourse on 
the infodemic: information as a disease, and information as a weapon. 
The tale of information as a disease promotes fighting “bad information” 
with “good information”. Anchored in the logic of medicalization of in-
security, it downplays the issue of agency, yet also focuses only on a very 
limited scope of systemic factors that contribute to the infodemic – typ-
ically the technological context of social media and digital technologies, 
which enable the fast spread of news and its global outreach. The tale of 
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information as a weapon approaches information disorder as a tool and 
a result of political rivalry. It is situated in military logic and focuses only 
on a very selective agency informed by a traditional geopolitical view of 
international affairs as shaped by great powers. In effect, each framing 
empowers different kinds of actors and forms of expertise and legitimizes 
different policy solutions.
These two frames are not mutually exclusive, and there are certainly 
other narratives on COVID-19 (dis)information than the ones discussed 
here. What these two demonstrate well, however, is distinct modalities 
of securitizing the health-information nexus, or securitizing information 
disorder in the context of global health. To recognize the multiplicity of 
intentions, types of harm, and dynamics of information circulation is in-
deed a key step in unpacking the phenomenon of the infodemic and ad-
dressing it as a complex, multi-layered ‘wicked problem’ (C F.  R I T T E L – W E B B E R 
19 73) . This means to accept that the problem contains several dimensions 
which might need to be addressed separately “with different types of urgency, 
expertise, and in a different mode of knowledge production” ( E VA N S E T A L .  2021:  198) .
The management of information disorder becomes a new space 
of global governance, and the pandemic only hastened these efforts.2 
Therefore, it is only advisable that scholars of global politics pay more at-
tention to the intersection of global health and information governance, 
and the broader socio-political and technological developments that un-
derpin this nexus. Among the key tasks for researchers is to explore what 
makes the conspiracy thinking on global health so popular and socially 
acceptable. Opening to literatures on disinformation, the politics of post-
truth, and conspiracy theories from political science, geography, sociology, 
policy studies and other related disciplines could be a good step to enrich 
the conceptual vocabulary and theoretical frameworks through which we 




1 Wardle and Derakshan suggest that “[m]is-information is when false information is shared, 
but no harm is meant. Dis-information is when false information is knowingly shared to cause 
harm. Mal-information is when genuine information is shared to cause harm, often by moving 
information designed to stay private into the public sphere ” (2017: 5).
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2 Prior attempts to govern information disorder include, for instance, programmes to 
fight online radicalization (Baker-Beall et al. 2014; Hoskins et al. 2011).
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